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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Isaac Joseph Rinke appeals from the district court’s summary dismissal of his
petition seeking post-conviction relief.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state initiated the underlying criminal case against Rinke by filing a complaint
on September 12, 2013, charging Rinke with felony domestic violence, attempted
strangulation, and aggravated assault. (#41696 R., pp. 5-7.1) Less than two weeks later,
on September 25, 2013, the state amended its complaint to charge felony domestic
violence, attempted strangulation, aggravated assault, second-degree kidnapping, and a
deadly weapon enhancement. (#41696 R., pp. 28-30.)

Rinke waived his preliminary

hearing and was bound over on the charges. (#41696 R., pp. 23, 31-36.) The charges were
based on his wife’s report that he had twice attacked her: the first time he had slammed her
head against a wall repeatedly, choked her, and hit her with a water bottle, and the second
time he had destroyed her property, threatened to kill her, and held a broken shard of glass
to her throat and again threatened to kill her. (#41696 PSI, pp. 3-4, 66-67.) On October
10, 2013, Rinke pled guilty to felony domestic violence and attempted strangulation, and
the state dismissed the remaining charges and enhancement. (#41696 R., p. 41.) The
district court imposed consecutive sentences of 10 years determinate for domestic violence
and 15 years indeterminate for attempted strangulation, for an aggregate sentence of 25

The district court took judicial notice of the record in the underlying criminal case. (R.,
p. 489 n. 1.) The state is filing, contemporaneously with this brief, a motion for the Court
to take judicial notice of the file in Docket Number 41696, the appeal from the criminal
judgment challenged by Rinke’s post-conviction petition.
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years with 10 years determinate. (#41696 R., pp. 50-54.) The Idaho Court of Appeals
affirmed the sentence on appeal. State v. Rinke, Docket No. 41696, 2014 Unpublished
Opinion No. 659 (Idaho App., August 12, 2014).
Rinke filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions and
sentences for felony domestic violence and attempted strangulation, asserting that his trial
counsel had been ineffective in preparing for trial, in relation to the guilty plea, and at
sentencing. (R., pp. 6-17.) Rinke subsequently filed an affidavit setting forth his factual
averments. (R., pp. 62-75.)
The state filed an answer generally denying that counsel was ineffective. (R., pp.
25-29.) The state also moved for summary disposition, asserting the petition “fail[ed] to
raise a genuine issue of material fact, is bare and conclusory, [and] contrary to the record
and law.” (R., p. 77; see also R., pp. 105-19 (brief in support of motion).) Attached to the
motion was State’s Exhibit 1, a transcript of the entry of plea and sentencing hearings in
the underlying criminal case. (R., pp. 79-104.)
Rinke responded with briefing (R., pp. 39-61, 158-69), affidavits (R., pp. 171-276),
and an amended petition (R., pp. 278-96). The state answered and moved to dismiss the
amended petition on the same general grounds as its first motion. (R., pp. 443-80.)
The district court granted the state’s motion. (R., pp. 489-506.) The district court
found that Rinke’s claims were either disproved by the record or were bare and conclusory.
(R., pp. 494-506.) Rinke timely appealed from the entry of the judgment. (R., pp. 50814.)
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ISSUES
Rinke states the issue on appeal as:
1. Whether the District Court committed reversible error by summarily
dismissing Mr. Rinke’s Post-Conviction Petition?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Did Rinke fail to present a viable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating
to his guilty plea?
2.
Did Rinke fail to present a viable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his
sentencing?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Rinke Failed To Present A Viable Claim That His Guilty Plea Was A Result Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
A.

Introduction
Rinke alleged that his guilty plea was the result of his attorney’s failure to provide

effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he claimed counsel “failed to adequately
prepare Mr. Rinke’s defense to the criminal charges,” which led him to “having no choice
but to plead guilty” (R., pp. 280-82); “failed to request a competency examination or mental
health evaluation,” which would have led to evidence he was “experiencing an acute
mental health exacerbation and crisis” that resulted in him entering a plea that “may not
have been knowing, voluntary [and] intelligent” (R., pp. 282-83, 284-86); failed to
“adequately inform” him of “the elements of the offenses” he pled guilty to, which resulted
in him pleading guilty despite having “affirmative defenses” (R., pp. 283-84); and made
statements about the proffered plea agreement that “were not accurate or were not placed
on the record” (R., p. 286). Review of the record and application of the correct legal
standards shows the district court properly dismissed these claims as either disproved by
the record or being bare and conclusory.
B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based
on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file ….”
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v.
State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).
4

C.

Rinke Has Shown No Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claims Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Related To His Guilty Plea
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary
dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on
the court’s own initiative, if the applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie
case as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden
of proof.” Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998). “Allegations
contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are
clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a
matter of law.” Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802.
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction
petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137,
774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). With respect to the deficient performance prong, the United
States Supreme Court has articulated the defendant’s burden under Strickland as follows:
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction must
show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must
apply a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance. The challenger’s burden
is to show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted). To
establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Richter,
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562 U.S. at 104. When the alleged deficiency involves counsel’s advice in relation to a
guilty plea, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)
(footnote and citations omitted).
Application of these standards shows no error in the district court’s order
summarily dismissing Rinke’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the
guilt-phase of the underlying criminal proceedings.
1.

Rinke’s Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims For Inadequate
Consultation And Investigation Were Meritless And Properly Dismissed

Rinke alleged counsel “failed to spend sufficient time” with him and failed to
“adequately confer” with him prior to Rinke pleading guilty to felony domestic violence
and attempted strangulation. (R., p. 280.) He alleged counsel failed to inform him of the
elements of the crimes to which he ultimately pled. (R., pp. 283-84.) He presented an
affidavit claiming his attorney met with him “approximately three times”—once for an
hour and one-half and twice for a “few minutes”—and spoke with him on the phone
“approximately 2 times” with one call lasting “approximately 20 minutes.” (R., pp. 6364.) Rinke asserted counsel failed to advise him of “the actual elements of the offenses,”
and “the specific details of the complaining witness’ allegations,” stating instead that they
“talked in general terms about the charges and the facts.” (R., p. 64.) As to prejudice, he
asserted: “Had I known the specific elements of the offenses, and specifically that Felony
Domestic Battery required evidence that I inflicted a ‘traumatic injury’ (Idaho Code §18918(1)(b), (2)(a)), and Attempted Strangulation required a specific intent to choke or
strangle (Idaho Code §18-923(3)), I would never have pled guilty.” (R., p. 65.)
6

The district court concluded that, at the plea colloquy, Rinke, under oath,
represented to the court that he was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty; that his
attorney had informed him of his rights, defenses and the possible consequences of his
plea; that he was satisfied with his attorney’s performance; that he had fully discussed
pleading guilty with his attorney; and that he had “enough time to discuss these matters
with his attorney.” (R., pp. 498-99 (citing #41696 Tr., p. 15, L. 25 – p. 16, L. 22; p. 17,
Ls. 1-8; p. 19, Ls. 17-24).) Thus, the record established that Rinke “was advised at length
of his constitutional rights and he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived those
rights when he pled guilty.” (R., p. 499.) The court then determined, “assuming” counsel
spent inadequate time consulting with Rinke, Rinke had failed to present evidence of how
this “affected the outcome of [the] case and why [Rinke] would have insisted on going to
trial.” (R., p. 500.) Moreover, the record affirmatively disproved Rinke’s claim he was
unaware of the elements of the crimes to which he pled guilty. (R., p. 501.)
The record supports the district court’s analysis. At his plea colloquy, Rinke stated
he understood “the nature of the charges” against him (#41696 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 13-17); stated
he understood the consequences of pleading guilty (#41696 Tr., p. 10, L. 13 – p. 12, L. 11);
denied pleading guilty “just to get it over with, even though [he believed he’s] innocent”
(#41696 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 13-15); stated the reason he was pleading guilty was because he
was guilty (#41696 Tr., p. 15, L. 25 – p. 16, L. 5); and acknowledged he “fully discuss[ed]
the matter of pleading guilty with [his] attorney,” felt he “had enough time to discuss these
matters with [his] attorney,” and stated that his attorney had, to his satisfaction, advised
him of his rights, defenses, and the possible consequences of pleading guilty (#41696 Tr.,
p. 16, L. 12 – p. 17, L. 8). The court explained to Rinke, as part of the plea colloquy, what
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facts the state would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt for a jury to convict Rinke
of the two charges, including that the state would have to prove he “inflicted a traumatic
injury” on the victim and that he “did willfully and unlawfully choke or attempt to strangle”
the victim, and Rinke stated he understood. (#41696 Tr., p. 18, L. 6 – p. 20, L. 4.) Rinke
specifically admitted that he committed the offense of domestic violence by throwing a
water bottle at the victim, which ricocheted off a wall and “smashed into her head,” and
answered “yes” to whether the victim “in fact” received injuries of “swelling and redness
in the head.” (#41696 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 8-20.) He admitted he committed the offense of
attempted strangulation by “grab[bing] her while she was lying in bed and sqeez[ing] her
around the throat.” (#41696 Tr., p. 21, L. 21 – p. 22, L. 2.)
Rinke claimed in post-conviction that his attorney failed to spend sufficient time
consulting with him, but he stated in his plea colloquy that his attorney had spent sufficient
time with him. Rinke claimed in post-conviction that his attorney failed to inform him of
the elements of the crime—specifically the elements of “traumatic injury” and intent to
choke or strangle—but Rinke acknowledged in his plea colloquy that he understood the
state had to prove these things beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury could convict him.
The record amply supports the district court’s dismissal of this claim, and Rinke provides
no specific argument otherwise. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-19.)
Rinke also alleged counsel “failed to investigate” prior to the entry of his guilty
pleas. (R., p. 280.) The evidence of counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the case
consisted primarily of claims that counsel failed to interview 11 potential defense witnesses
as requested by Rinke. (R., pp. 66-67.) Rinke presented affidavits from four of those
alleged potential witnesses, who stated they had not been contacted regarding the case. (R.,
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pp. 350-65.) Rebecca Goodwin’s affidavit stated that, if contacted, she would have
testified that the victim told her Rinke “aggressively pushed her up against a wall, that he
put his hands around her neck, that she felt some ‘crunching’ as a result, and that she had
hit her head as a result of being pushed up against the wall.” (R., p. 351.) Yurek Hansen
would have testified that the victim told him Rinke had “thrown her or slammed her against
a wall” and “threw a water bottle which bounced off of a wall and hit her in the head, during
the same series of events.” (R., p. 355.) Jim Moison, the victim’s ex-husband, stated the
victim had “a history of dishonesty and deceit” who would “engage in dishonesty for her
own purposes,” and gave a couple of alleged examples of dishonest behavior. (R., pp. 35859.) Jonathon Scaggs, a co-worker of Rinke’s, would have testified that near the time of
the crimes Rinke appeared depressed and made statements about hurting himself, so he
encouraged Rinke to get help, which he did. (R., pp. 362-63.) Rinke asserted in his
affidavits that he “felt like [he] was left with no other choice than to plead guilty” because
his attorney “was not willing or able to pursue the evidence and witnesses necessary … to
stage a strong defense against the charges.” (R., pp. 305, 320-21.)
Rinke’s allegations fail to show a prima facie claim of either deficient performance
or prejudice. Although failure to contact potential defense witnesses prior to trial would
likely constitute deficient performance, Rinke has failed to show why it would be deficient
performance to recommend that Rinke accept the state’s offer to dismiss two felony
charges and the enhancement in exchange for guilty pleas to two of the charges prior to
speaking with all of the potential defense witnesses. Rinke did not, for example, allege
that counsel was unaware of what evidence Rinke believed the witnesses could provide
when he made his recommendation that Rinke plead guilty.

9

“In assessing the

reasonableness of counsel’s investigation, we consider not only the quantum of evidence
known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney
to investigate further.” Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396, 412–13, 327 P.3d 372, 388–89
(Ct. App. 2013). Rinke presented no reason why a reasonably competent counsel would
have investigated further than what his client told him about potential defense witnesses
prior to recommending acceptance of the state’s plea offer.
Rinke’s claim of prejudice fails for similar reasons. Rinke does not claim he was
ignorant of what the potential defense witnesses would have testified to. “In order to
demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner is required to show that as a result of counsel’s deficient
performance ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho
671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
His affidavit asserts that he pled guilty because he “felt” his attorney was not going to
present a vigorous defense and “realized” his attorney “was not going to interview the
potential witnesses,” but he does not assert his attorney ever told him this and presents no
other basis (much less evidence) for his “feelings” and “realization.” (R., pp. 305, 32021.) The record shows Rinke accepted the state’s plea offer and entered his guilty pleas
within a month of the filing of the complaint and within two weeks of the filing of the
information. (#41696 R., pp. 5, 34, 41.) No trial was ever scheduled because, at the
arraignment, the parties requested that the matter be set for entry of plea. (#41696 R., p.
40.) Rinke’s subjective belief that counsel’s failure to interview his 11 witnesses within a
month after the complaint was filed meant that such interviews would never occur and
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therefore he could not get a fair as-yet-not-scheduled trial did not establish a claim of
prejudice meriting an evidentiary hearing.
On appeal Rinke argues the district court erred because he did establish a prima
facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and there was a genuine issue of material
fact. (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.) Specifically, Rinke argues that the evidence from the
potential witnesses would have created “ripe grounds for cross-examination and
impeachment” of the victim and counsel failed to “obtain this crucial evidence.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-17.) Although this might be a potentially meritorious argument
had this case proceeded to trial, it is irrelevant to whether counsel acted competently in
relation to the guilty plea. There was no cross-examination or impeachment of the victim
at the guilty plea proceedings and, according to his own factual claims, Rinke and his
counsel were aware of the witnesses and their potential testimony (even if counsel had not
“obtain[ed]” the testimony) when they decided to enter the plea agreement with the state.
Rinke has failed to show that counsel was constitutionally required to talk to the potential
witnesses prior to entering the plea agreement, or that there was a reasonable probability
that Rinke would have elected to proceed to trial instead of enter the plea agreement had
counsel talked to the witnesses.
2.

Rinke’s Claim Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Obtaining A Competency
Evaluation Or A Mental Health Evaluation For Sentencing Was Meritless
And Properly Dismissed

Rinke alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a competency evaluation
prior to entry of the guilty plea. (R., pp. 282-85.) He supported this claim with (a) his own
affidavit claiming he “experienced a complete mental breakdown” after his arrest, was
placed on a “strong anti-psychotic medication” by jail staff, and stabilized only after being
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incarcerated in the prison (R. pp. 68-70); (b) a report from Dr. Ward concluding there was
“strong evidence” Rinke was “experiencing an acute mental health exacerbation and crisis
when incarcerated” and “no evidence” that Rinke’s mental state was “stabilized prior to
his medical proceedings” (R., p. 399); (c) the affidavit of Jonathon Scaggs stating that
Rinke appeared depressed and made statements about hurting himself near the time of the
crimes (R., pp. 362-63); and (d) jail medical records showing Rinke was treated for mental
health issues, was placed on suicide watch, and reported symptoms of anxiety (R., pp. 25976). The district court rejected the competency evaluation claim because there was “no
evidence showing that [Rinke] was incompetent during the proceedings in the underlying
case, or that his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a mental health evaluation.”
(R., p. 495.) The district court further stated that a mental health evaluation was done for
sentencing, which did not indicate Rinke was incompetent. (R., pp. 495-96.) The court
noted that Rinke’s claim that counsel should have involved him more in preparing his own
defense was inconsistent with any claim of incompetence. (R., p. 496.) Finally, the district
court concluded that Dr. Ward’s statement that Rinke was not stabilized during the legal
proceedings was “conclusory and contrary to the record in the underlying case.” (R., pp.
496-97.)
Application of relevant legal standards shows no error by the district court. “The
two-pronged test for competency to stand trial is whether a defendant has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and
whether he has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him.”
State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314, 325, 271 P.3d 712, 723 (2012) (internal quotes and
brackets omitted). Although there was certainly evidence that Rinke suffered mental health
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problems, none of that evidence shows those mental health issues were of the type or nature
to prevent Rinke from having a “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding” and a “rational, as well as factual,
understanding of the proceedings against him.” Rinke cites to the evidence of his mental
health issues, but makes no attempt to show how that evidence relates to the proper legal
standard for competency. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.) Because Rinke does not articulate
how the evidence he presented establishes incompetency under the relevant legal standard,
he has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of this claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel for not seeking a competency evaluation.
3.

Rinke’s Claim That Counsel Misrepresented The Terms Of The Plea
Agreement Was Properly Dismissed

Rinke alleged counsel was ineffective for making inaccurate statements to him
about the plea agreement or failing to put terms of the plea agreement on the record. (R.,
p. 286.) The inaccurate statement was that the state would recommend “a sentence of five
years, with two years determinate and three years indeterminate, with the Court retaining
jurisdiction.” (R., p. 71.) The district court concluded this claim was contradicted by the
record because the plea agreement was stated on the record prior to the entry of the plea
and Rinke failed to show any prejudice from the alleged inaccurate statement. (R., p. 504.)
The record supports this conclusion. At the guilty plea hearing counsel for both
parties specifically stated that sentencing recommendations were not part of the plea
agreement. (#41696 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 13-21.) Rinke, when asked by the court whether he
agreed with his counsel’s “representations to the Court regarding your conversations
concerning these guilty pleas,” answered that he did. (#41696 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 20-25.) He
also stated that he understood that his guilty pleas would expose him to sentences of “up
13

to 25 years in prison” and that “the only person who can promise [him] what sentence [he]
will actually receive is the judge.” (#41696 Tr., p. 8, L. 16 – p. 9, L. 2; p. 12, Ls. 20-23.)
This case is indistinguishable from that of Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 187
P.3d 1253 (Ct. App. 2008). Nevarez asserted that “counsel misrepresented the terms of the
plea agreement” by guaranteeing he would “receive only a sentence of fifteen years with
three years determinate,” which was less than the mandatory minimum. Id. at 884, 187
P.3d at 1259. Nevarez supported his claim with affidavits from himself and his son. Id.
However, Nevarez’s factual assertions were “contradicted by the record” which showed
the plea agreement placed on the record, a lack of objection to the terms expressed in open
court, Nevarez’s expression of understanding the terms of the plea agreement, and the
court’s articulation of the mandatory minimum sentence. Id. “Furthermore, even if
counsel did misinform Nevarez about the mandatory minimum sentence, this erroneous
advice was cured by the trial court’s clear statements that the mandatory minimum sentence
for trafficking would apply.” Id. at 885, 187 P.3d at 1260. As in Nevarez, the record of
the underlying criminal case contradicts Rinke’s claim, demonstrating that he entered his
guilty plea with a full understanding of the terms of the agreement.
On appeal Rinke argues that “it appears that the District Court did not follow the
appropriate standard, and required Mr. Rinke to show more than a prima facie case.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) Rinke does not cite to the record or any part of the district court’s
analysis in support of this assertion. More importantly, the district court was not applying
the prima facie claim standard: it specifically said it was dismissing the claim because it
was “contradicted by the record.” (R., p. 504.) Even if a petitioner’s allegations and factual
claims present a viable claim on their face, if those factual claims are refuted by the record
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of the underlying criminal case then summary dismissal is appropriate. Nevarez, 145 Idaho
at 884-85, 187 P.3d at 1259-60; -see --also -----------Eddington v. State, ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___,
2017 WL 1842828, at *6 (Idaho Ct. App. May 8, 2017) (“Because the record contradicts
Eddington’s argument, the district court properly summarily dismissed this claim.”).
Rinke’s argument does not address the legal standard actually applied by the district court.
The district court concluded that Rinke’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
leading to his guilty plea were not viable claims meriting an evidentiary hearing. Review
of the record and application of the relevant legal standards show that Rinke’s claims are
either facially without merit, are unsupported by a demonstration of admissible evidence,
or are contradicted by the record of the underlying criminal proceedings. Rinke has failed
to show error in the summary dismissal of these claims.
II.
Rinke Has Failed To Present A Viable Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In
His Sentencing
A.

Introduction
Rinke alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for allegedly failing to obtain a

mental health evaluation for sentencing, failing to inform him of his right to remain silent
in the pre-sentence investigation and domestic violence evaluation, failing to object to
“improper statements and items” provided at sentencing, and failing to object to “improper
statements made by the District Judge” at sentencing. (R., pp. 286-90.) The district court
dismissed these claims as lacking legal merit or because they were contradicted by the
record of the underlying criminal proceedings. (R., pp. 495-97, 502-05.) Rinke asserts he
did present viable claims that merited an evidentiary hearing. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-
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27.) Review of Rinke’s arguments in the context of the record and applicable legal
standards show he has failed to demonstrate error by the district court.
B.

Standard Of Review
“‘[W]hen reviewing a district court’s order of summary dismissal in a post-

conviction relief proceeding, we apply the same standard as that applied by the district
court.’” Takhsilov v. State, 161 Idaho 669, 672, 389 P.3d 955, 958 (2016) (quoting Ridgley
v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010)). Under this standard the Court
“must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions
and admissions together with any affidavits on file.” Id.
“When considering summary dismissal, the district court must construe disputed
facts in the petitioner’s favor, but the court is not required to accept either the petitioner’s
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner’s
conclusions of law.” Mallory v. State, 159 Idaho 715, 718, 366 P.3d 637, 640 (Ct. App.
2015). “Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner’s allegations are clearly
disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented
evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the
petitioner’s allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law.” Id.
C.

Rinke Failed To Establish A Viable Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
At Sentencing
“To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show

that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the
deficiency.” Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011). “The manner
of cross-examination and the lack of objections to testimony are considered tactical or
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strategic decisions.” Eddington v. State, No. 44353, 2017 WL 1842828, at *5 (Idaho Ct.
App. May 8, 2017). “Bare assertions or speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not
suffice to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.” Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 764,
760 P.2d 1174, 1180 (1988). To show prejudice from deficient performance at sentencing
the petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable probability the result of the sentencing
proceeding would have been different.” State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 495, 348 P.3d
1, 110 (2015).
Rinke alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to inform the Court
that a mental health evaluation was necessary for sentencing purposes.” (R., p. 286.) The
district court summarily dismissed this claim, at least in part, because “a mental health
evaluation was ordered, performed and provided to the Court prior to sentencing.” (R., pp.
496-97.) That evaluation was ordered by the court after it took Rinke’s guilty plea (#41696
Tr., p. 22, L. 7 – p. 23, L. 2) and is in the record in the underlying criminal case (#41696
PSI, pp. 50-63; see also pp. 18-19, 164-251, 303-08). Trial counsel did not render deficient
performance by not requesting what the trial court itself ordered, and Rinke was not
prejudiced because the mental health evidence in the record at sentencing was extensive.
Rinke argues that his trial counsel “committed legal error by failing to inform the
Court that a mental health evaluation was necessary for sentencing purposes” and that his
“failure led to a much harsher sentence.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-25.) He also states
trial counsel “took no steps to ensure that a comprehensive mental health evaluation was
performed.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 25.) This argument is nothing more than a restatement
of Rinke’s pleadings. (R., p. 286 (counsel “committed legal error by failing to inform the
Court that a mental health evaluation was necessary for sentencing purposes, which later
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led to Mr. Rinke being sentenced more harshly by the District Court”).) Rinke fails to
address the district court’s holding that the mental health evaluation and materials included
in sentencing as demonstrated in the record of the underlying criminal case disprove this
claim. Because he does not address the district court’s actual analysis and holding, Rinke
has failed to show error by the district court.
Rinke also claimed that “[c]ounsel and the Court failed to advise [him] of his
ongoing right to remain silent” rather than participate in the PSI and the domestic violence
evaluation. (R., p. 288.) The district court dismissed this claim because, as part of the plea
colloquy, Rinke waived his right to silence regarding those evaluations, and therefore there
was no prejudice regardless of “any failure” by counsel in this regard. (R., pp. 503-504.)
The record supports this determination. During the colloquy the trial court asked Rinke
whether he understood that he was waiving his right against self-incrimination, including
“any right you may have to refuse to participate in a presentence investigation, an alcohol
or substance abuse evaluation, a domestic violence or anger evaluation, or a psychological
or psychiatric evaluation to assist the Court in sentencing,” to which Rinke answered, “Yes,
Your Honor.” (#41696 Tr., p. 17, L. 9 – p. 18, L. 5.) Because the district court explained
the right in open court, and took Rinke’s waiver, prior to the plea, any failure by counsel
to explain this to Rinke was not prejudicial.
On appeal Rinke merely re-states his allegations. (Compare Appellant’s brief, pp.
25-26 with R., p. 288.) Because Rinke has not addressed the district court’s holding or
reasoning on appeal, he has failed to show error.
Rinke claimed his counsel was ineffective for failing to “object to several improper
statements and items of information” at sentencing. (R., p. 288.) Specifically, he alleged
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counsel should have objected to “misinformation regarding dismissed charges,”
prosecution statements about his potential dangerousness, and the victim’s sentencing
recommendations. (R., pp. 288-89; see also R., pp. 73-74.) The district court rejected the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the prosecutor’s comments
on dismissed charges because such an objection would have been without merit. (R., p.
503.) It rejected the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the
victim statement because counsel did, in fact, object. (R., p. 503.)
The record supports the district court’s rulings. The prosecutor recited the facts as
contained in the PSI regarding Rinke’s prior arrest on domestic violence charges. (#41696
Tr., p. 62, L. 17 – p. 63, L. 20; see also #41696 PSI, pp. 11-12.) This was proper argument.
State v. Ott, 102 Idaho 169, 170, 627 P.2d 798, 799 (1981) (“In arriving at its sentencing
decision the court was within its authority in considering prior charges against Ott which
had been dismissed and the pending charges against him for battery, resisting arrest and
possession of stolen property.”); State v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 409, 411, 825 P.2d 506, 508
(Ct. App. 1992) (“The district court may, with due caution, consider the existence of the
defendant’s alleged criminal activity for which no charges have been filed, or where
charges have been dismissed.”).

Rinke’s counsel entered a specific objection to

consideration of the victim’s sentencing recommendation, which the court overruled
because such a recommendation was only inadmissible in capital cases. (#41696 Tr., p.
59, L. 25 – p. 60, L. 15.) The district court did not err in dismissing these claims.
Rinke also alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to correct certain factual
findings by the district court regarding the extent of the victim’s injuries. (R., pp. 289-90.)
The evidence presented was the sentencing transcript, pages 92-93, and Rinke’s affidavit
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stating the findings were “erroneous and improper.” (R., p. 74.) The district court’s
statements were that the CT scan showed “swelling on the interior structures of the neck,”
and photographs showed “bruising” and “scratches.” (#41696 Tr., p. 92, L. 20 – p. 93, L.
16.) The medical records attached to the PSI in the underlying criminal case shows that a
CT scan of the victim’s neck revealed swelling. (#41696 PSI, pp. 146, 149-50.) The
photographs attached to the PSI show that the victim had bruising and scratches on her
neck. (#41696 PSI, pp. 95-97, 99.)
The district court dismissed this claim on the basis that claims of factual error or
judicial misconduct could have been raised on appeal. (R., pp. 502-03.) Rinke correctly
points out that his claim is of ineffective assistance of counsel, which is not an issue that
could have been raised in the appeal in the underlying criminal case. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 26-27.) However, a claim of clear error in the factual findings could have been raised
on appeal, State v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673, 677, 315 P.3d 861, 865 (Ct. App. 2013) (review
of factual findings at sentencing is based on clear error standard), so the claim that the court
erred could have been raised by appellate counsel, yet Rinke did not allege appellate
counsel was ineffective.
Even if Rinke had established that the district court employed an erroneous theory,
his argument that his claim was erroneously dismissed would still fail. The state asked for
dismissal below on the basis that evidence of the victim’s injuries was presented at the
sentencing. (R., pp. 474-75.) It is well established that when the trial court “reaches the
correct result by an erroneous theory,” the Idaho Supreme Court “will affirm the result on
the correct theory.” Deiter v. Coons, 162 Idaho 44, 394 P.3d 87, 91 (2017). See also State
v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 417, 348 P.3d 1, 32 (2015) (“If a district court reaches the
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correct result by an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the order upon the correct
theory.”); Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Mussell, 139 Idaho 28, 33, 72 P.3d 868, 873
(2003) (same). Moreover, as stated above, this Court directly applies the summary
dismissal standard. Takhsilov, 161 Idaho at 672, 389 P.3d at 958. Applying those
standards shows the district court reached the right result, regardless of the reason, because
the district court’s factual findings at sentencing were supported by the evidence before it.
It was neither deficient performance nor prejudicial for trial counsel not to challenge the
sentencing court’s finding that the victim suffered from external bruising and internal
swelling of her neck as a result of being choked by Rinke.
Rinke raised several claims that trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing, but his
factual claims bear no resemblance to the contemporaneous record of what actually
happened in the trial court. The district court properly summarily dismissed these claims,
and Rinke has failed to show error.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 25th day of October, 2017.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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